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The U.S. Defense Industry After the Cold War 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
The U.S. defense inaustry is adjusting to the end of the Cold War far more rapidly and 
far more effectively than was generally expected. Many of the changes to date have been 
painful and the end of the adjustment process is not yet in sight. Nevertheless, today's national 
security decision makers can count on the presence of a strong defense industrial base. But that 
positive situation cannot be taken for granted in the years ahead. I would like to offer one 
economist's evaluation of the future challenges facing the U.S. military establishment and the 
private-sector companies on which it relies so strongly. 
To judge the adequacy of the future defense industrial base in an uncertain post-Cold 
War environment is a challenge indeed. It requires us to deal simultaneously with a set of 
paradoxes - to develop an international orientation at a time when the nation is focused on 
domestic concerns, to consider expanding military outlays in a period of budgetary austerity, 
and to worry about the adequacy of competition for the production of weapon systems when the 
economy is adjusting to a wave of mergers, consolidations, and downsizing. 
This is a tall order, so let us begin with fundamentals. As an ex-defense industry 
planner, I instinctively start with an examination of the major threats to our national security. 
To state the obvious - although it may not be so clear to all our fellow citizens - the United 
States continues to exist in a dangerous world. 
The Changing Threats to National Security 
The key danger to our security is no longer a large array of Soviet strategic systems 
presumably aimed at this nation. Those missiles and bombers may not now be aimed at us, but 
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-and a fundamental "but"- the uncertain control over the technological resources developed 
by the Soviets is far from comforting. Developing countries in Asia have been acquiring a wide 
variety of high-tech equipment from the spin-off nations of the former Soviet Union - including 
SU-27 attack aircraft, MIG-31 fighters, T-72 tanks, and MI-17 helicopters. More fundamen-
tally, China is emerging - once again - as a great power, both economically and militarily. 
Credible reports indicate that China is buying two or more Sovremenny-class missile destroyers 
from Russia; that ship's main armament is the SS-N-22 supersonic antiship missile. 
Simultaneously, large and indeterminate assortments of terrorists and other troublemak-
ers are developing the capability to do considerable harm to the people of this country and to 
our friends and allies. We have to be concerned when we read reports such as the following: 
• At several naval bases around Vladivostok, about 24 highly radioactive reactor 
cores cut out of dismantled nuclear submarines are either floating in bays or sitting 
in unsafe ground storage. Guards at the Vladivostok bases frequently go several 
months between paychecks. Thousands of Chinese traders and entrepreneurs have 
been drawn to the city. According to one Russian investigator of the loss of nuclear 
fuel, "Potatoes were guarded better than naval fuel." 
• Biological weapons, which are far easier to manufacture, transport, and disseminate 
than any other type of weapon of mass destruction, are of growing importance in 
the post-Soviet environment. Anthrax, for example, can be made by a biology 
student in a lab the size of a microbrewery. A small suitcase can contain enough to 
kill hundreds of thousands of people. As for the delivery platform, anthrax can be 
readily sprayed from a crop duster. 
• Between 1991 and 1996, about 5,000 employees left the Ukrainian Southern Ma-
chine Building Plant. That facility specializes in developing and producing SS-18 
missiles. During the same period, the All Russian Scientific Research Institute of 
Experimental Physics, which specializes in nuclear warhead R&D, lost about 5,000 
people. All in all, the numbers of unemployed scientists and engineers in Russia 
and other parts of the former Soviet Union are at a record high. 
• Libyan and Iranian "university representatives" are stepping up efforts to recruit 
various categories of scientists. 
All of this reminds me of the lament of a speaker at a recent conference on national 
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security, "Peace is hell." 
Surely, today's situation requires developing a very different response from that which was 
appropriate during the Cold War - in terms of intelligence and communication; planning and 
strategy; research, development, and production capability; and force structure. But that does 
not necessarily mean a drastically lesser response. The United States needs the capability to 
participate in a new spectrum of conflict, which may include low-intensity and urban warfare 
and serious situations of global crime and lawlessness, in addition to conventional confrontations 
between major national powers. 
Viewed in this light, the current practice of cutting back the equipment and personnel 
required during the Cold War is surely not the end of the process of adjusting to a new environ-
ment. Rather, it is the beginning. Of course, at a time of tight budgeting, it is foolish to devote 
the limited funding to activities supported more by sentiment for the past rather than the needs 
of the future. Military pork was never fully justified, but the "opportunity cost" of such indul-
gences is much higher than ever. 
Maintaining an Adequate Industrial Base 
Thus, we must tum to the key task of how to maintain the capability of designing and 
producing the military systems and forces that will be needed to deal with future threats. 
Viewed in this light, the concern with the defense industrial base is far more than a matter of 
contract forms, cost controls, and business procedures. Fundamentally, we are dealing with the 
continued ability to possess an appropriate and adequate arsenal of military power in a danger-
ous world. To restate the challenge facing this conference: how will the United States maintain 
the defense industry's innovative, managerial, and technological strength so vital to the national 
security at a time of profound downsizing? 
We are facing levels of funding for military R&D and procurement that, in real terms, are 
much less than one-half of the 1985 numbers. As we will see, the comparisons in terms of 
reduced shares of gross domestic product (GOP) and federal budgets are even more striking and 
numbers alone do not convey the intensity of the problem. 
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Compounding the loss of much of the traditional military market has been the challenge of 
fending off the pressures to "convert" defense industry resources to civilian markets. This 
"second front" was opened in the mistaken belief that Congress will only approve substantial 
reductions in the military budget so long as defense industry jobs are maintained, albeit for 
civilian work. This is not a blanket criticism of diversification. After all, when I left Boeing in 
the 1960s, it was primarily a military contractor, with an important but much smaller commer-
cial aircraft division. Today, Boeing is the premier producer of civilian aircraft, with a strong 
but much smaller defense sector. However, that fundamental change occurred voluntarily and in 
response to clear market opportunities. 
The more recent conversion pressures that were, in the main, successfully resisted, would 
have involved large government subsidies and new controls. All this would have been aimed at 
forcing management attention to shift to civilian nonaircraft markets, which most of these 
companies have flubbed time and again. Such dissipation of their limited resources would have 
left these companies in weak financial shape. It also would have threatened the technological 
strength of the defense industrial base. 
Fortunately, the major defense companies followed a very different and more sensible set 
of approaches, each of which reflected tough-minded and realistic management decisions. The 
result has been a financially stable set of prime contractors, some quite strong in terms of their 
profit structures. This has been true for most traditional defense contractors, except for produc-
ers of conventional ammunition. With the likelihood of a reduced number of major prime 
contracts to be awarded in the years ahead, many of the historic primes merged with or acquired 
some of their traditional rivals. Marriage partners included Lockheed and Martin (who then 
merged with Loral}, Northrop and Grumman, and, subject to antitrust review, Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas. 
These and other important defense contractors eliminated large divisions that were viable 
but not industry leaders. General Dynamics sold its space systems to Martin and its tactical 
aircraft business to Lockheed. General Motors' Hughes subsidiary is selling its defense elec-
tronics activity to Raytheon, which has acquired Texas Instruments' defense unit. Ford's Aero-
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space, IBM's Federal Systems Division, and Unisys' defense systems operations all went to 
Loral (on its way to Lockheed Martin). Northrop Grumman acquired Vought Aircraft and the 
defense work of Westinghouse - and the trend continues. 
Since 1993, approximately $70 billion in mergers and acquisitions have occurred among 
the major defense-oriented companies. During this restructuring, the aerospace industry work 
force declined 39 percent, from a peak of 1.33 million in 1989 to 806,000 in 1996. Coinciden-
tally, the Department of Defense estimates a 39 percent decrease in total defense-related employ-
ment between 1989 and 1997- or about 5 percent a year. 
Not surprisingly, some serious critics - including the Defense Science Board - bemoan 
the prospect of declining competition for military contracts, accompanied by higher prices and 
poorer products. In their view, those adverse results could flow from a reduced number of 
competitors. As a general proposition, of course, competition is good, so more is better than 
less. However, that traditional approach to the antitrust laws is now passe. After all, in the past 
two decades, the antitrust authorities allowed a host of mergers between active competitors in 
civilian markets. In the 1960s and 1970s, comparable corporate marriages likely would have 
been challenged if not stopped. 
Since 1980, many large banks, retail chains, communications companies, and manufactur-
ers have merged quite successfully. The civilian economy is much healthier for that consolida-
tion. We have not witnessed the bursts of price increases that would, at one time, have been 
expected to accompany the declines of measured competition. Rather, American consumers are 
enjoying the most benign inflation situation in many years - and with high and rising levels of 
employment. 
The new approach to antitrust enforcement is not one of laxity. It reflects, instead, the 
changing nature of the marketplace, especially the globalization of business and the rise of 
cross-border competition. The case of the military marketplace is somewhat similar but not 
identical. (I am ignoring the possibility of resorting to the national security exemption which 
some legal authorities would apply to antitrust matters.) Perhaps the most strikingly unique 
characteristic of defense procurement is that, even after the current merger wave, production 
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capability will likely exceed by far the procurement of defense products. 
I shudder to think of the consequences if the conventional antitrust approach had been 
applied to the recent wave of defense industry mergers and acquisitions. The result would have 
been a larger number of fmancially weak firms. Most of them would lack the critical mass 
required to maintain high levels of research and development. The losers would not have been 
restricted to shareholders. Rather, the national security would have suffered the erosion of the 
quantity and likely the quality of defense technology. 
The reality that policymakers are acknowledging is that in the foreseeable future the 
Department of Defense will be ordering fewer weapon systems from a smaller group of compa-
nies than it was accustomed to during the Cold War era. We may well see a shift in formal 
emphasis from price competition back to design competition. But, in reality, I sense that 
technological superiority has continued to be the key factor all along. This gut feeling is sup-
ported by GAO estimates showing that "full and open competition" accounts for very small 
percentages of weapon system procurement (27 percent in the case of aircraft during 1986 to 
1994 and 28 percent in the case of missiles). Most important, the competition for the award of 
contracts for new weapon systems remains intense. 
One important change in defense contracting procedures would be helpful. Because major 
production contracts are likely to be few and far between, the rates of return on research and 
development should be raised substantially. Military R&D no longer can be viewed as a loss 
leader. Contractors must be given a greater incentive to devote their resources to R&D even in 
the absence of winning large production orders. 
Overall, the defense industry is in far better shape than might have been expected from the 
loss of so much of its basic market. The results are very positive when we examine the financial 
statements of the six major primes- Lockheed Martin, United Technologies, McDonnell 
Douglas, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics. In 1996, their combined 
military and civilian sales came to $98.6 billion, generating $4.5 billion in aggregate profits. 
The stock market valued these six companies at an impressive $95.7 billion (see Table 1). 
In light of these good numbers, it is not surprising that, in spite of the massive cutbacks in 
.. 
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Table 1 
Financial Condition of Key Prime Contractors in 1996 
COMPANY SALES PROAl'S MARKET VALUE 
Yearly Yearly 
(in billions) Change (in billions) Change (in billions) 
Lockheed Martin $26.9 18 % $1.3 98% $17.8 
United Technologies 23.5 3 0.9 21 18.1 
McDonnell Douglas 13.8 -3 0.8 - 14.4 
Northrop Grumman 8.1 18 0.2 -7 4.3 
Boeing 22.7 16 1.1 179 36.7 
General Dynamics 3.6 17 0.2 9 4.4 
Total $98.6 $4.5 $95.7 
Source: Company annual reports. 
U.S. defense spending, no plea has been heard for taxpayer bailouts of faltering defense contrac-
tors. Then-Secretary of Defense William Perry's admonition was good policy but too pessimis-
tic a forecast: "We expect companies to go out of business, and we will stand by and let that 
happen." No Chrysler-style corporate loan guarantee program was necessary- or even 
requested- much less the 1930s-type of U.S. Reconstruction Finance Corporation to help 
ailing companies. It reminds me of the famous Sherlock Holmes story where the key clue was 
that the dog did not bark. Similarly, the most important point in military-industry relationships 
in the post-Cold War period has been the absence of crisis. 
On the positive side, we should acknowledge the streamlining of much of the byzantine 
procurement process and the resultant reduction of overhead costs on the part of both buyers 
and sellers. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 was far from a panacea, but it 
has been a constructive force. Also helpful have been efforts to eliminate some military stan-
dards and to move to using more commercial practices. 
A more controversial aspect has been allowing merging firms to bill some of the costs of 
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reorganization as overhead on existing defense contracts. Such costs include severance pay for 
tenninated employees, early retirement incentives, and relocation expenses. The critics refer to 
this procedure as "payoffs for layoffs." However, the savings to the government from the 
resulting efficiencies are reported to offset by far the magnitude of the allowable costs. 
Perhaps this carrot could in some way be used to encourage closing down more of the 
unneeded production lines than has been the case to date. A number of defense contractors, 
such as McDonnell Douglas, have eliminated some excess production facilities. But these 
closures have not been universal. According to recent reports, Northrop-Grumman still has all 
nine plants producing aerostructures. Lockheed Martin still maintains its three original aircraft 
lines in California, Texas, and Georgia. Some defense analysts have urged the federal govern-
ment to "buy out" the industry's excess capacity. Why not instead tie the generous treatment of 
allowable costs to "biting that bullet"? 
Overall, defense factories are reputed to be operating at about 60 percent of capacity -
compared to 83 percent for industry generally. Rather than continuing to bear the expense of 
maintaining all of the elderly production facilities of the Cold War, it might make more sense to 
set aside those funds in case the need arises for building new facilities in the decades ahead. 
Guidelines for the Future 
What about the future? The federal budget for fiscal 1998 envisions further cutbacks in 
the real level of defense spending. Frankly, I do not know whether that amount is too high or 
too low. The interaction between the needs estimated by defense planners and the economizing 
efforts of budget officials is inherently a bargaining process involving a series of iterations. As a 
sometime participant in that process, I know how difficult it is. But the need for sound budget-
ing of defense hardly is a transient phenomenon. It was noted over a century ago by C.F. 
Bastable in his classic work on public finance: "To maintain a due balance between the exces-
sive demands of . . . military officials, and the undue reductions . . . sought by the advocates of 
economy, is one of the difficult tasks of the statesman." 
We must admit that, to most citizens, $250 billion of proposed new budget authority for 
9 
the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 1998 sounds like a lot of money, and it is. Never-
theless, I feel uncomfortable with a 3 percent decrease in real terms from the 1997 level ap-
proved by Congress. This also means continuing the negative trend in fmance that began in 
1986 and which now is the largest continuing decline in military fmance since the end of World 
War II. The defense share ofGDP declined from 7.5 percent in 1971 to 3.3 percent in 1996, 
while the military share of the budget dropped from 38 percent to 16 percent during the same 
time period. Meanwhile, the budgetary allocations to social security, medicare, and other 
"entitlements" have continued to soar. They now dominate federal spending. And there are no 
signs of reversing that upward trend in civilian budgets. If anything, it is likely to accelerate in 
the decades ahead. Thus, the downward pressures on military budgets cannot be expected to 
abate. 
The overall fiscal outlook for the United States is not very satisfying to any serious analyst 
of governmental fmances. The bipartisan forecasts of balancing the federal budget by the year 
2002 are more comforting than is justified by the underlying reality. I am not referring to the 
obvious point that the latest federal budget projects the deficit rising for the next year or two. 
We can even gloss over the unfortunate fact that the dull knife wielded by the White House and 
the Congress means that the major cuts in civilian spending will be postponed to the early part 
of the next century. That is the good news, relatively. The truly bad news is that, even assum-
ing that the federal budget really will be in balance by 2002, huge deficits will face the Ameri-
can people in the years that follow. 
Dealing with the built-in future increases in entitlement outlays as the U.S. population ages 
is the heart of the future fiscal challenge. Except for military retirement pay, however, these are 
issues that we cannot deal with here. In this light, austerity would seem to be the order of the 
day for defense planners. Soft and marginal areas of spending must be eliminated- no matter 
the political cost- if any new expansions in military capabilities are to be seriously considered. 
Given the uncertainly and surely the changing nature of the threats to our national security, that 
shift in military priorities from the old to the new is essential. Inevitably, those budget cuts will 
hit the personnel and operations and maintenance accounts hardest. Nevertheless, production, 
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construction, and even research, development, training, and education cannot be totally immune 
from the budgetary scalpel. 
In these difficult circumstances, there is something useful that economists can offer defense 
planners and decision makers. So here are some thoughts that may be helpful in responding to 
the critics, if not now then surely in the future. The weight of economic analysis strongly 
supports the view that - within the relevant range of debate - this nation can afford whatever 
level of military outlays it believes necessary. This is a by-product of work some years ago on 
the economics of arms control and disarmament. The pertinent question is not the ability of the 
economy to produce defense goods and services. Rather, the key limitation is the willingness of 
society to devote a substantial share of its resources to the purpose of protecting the national 
security. 
Virtually every analysis of the burden of defense spending has concluded that, if necessary, 
the American economy can handle a much higher level of such spending than it now does. But 
there is a flip side to all this. The same studies show that the growth and prosperity of the 
United States do not require even the current level of national security spending. The past 
decade has demonstrated quite clearly that, given a relatively short period of adjustment, the 
American economy can attain reasonable prosperity with a greatly reduced defense establish-
ment. In fact, the overall growth rate could be enhanced if a large share of the resources 
previously devoted to defense were shifted to capital formation. By capital formation, I mean 
civilian research and development, new private-sector production facilities and equipment, and 
education and training. 
There surely is no continuing "correct" share of gross domestic product that should be 
allocated to defense. The ratio that exists at any time is the accidental result of the federal 
government's response to a variety of pressures and factors. Because one number can always be 
divided into another does not necessarily indicate that any functional relationship is present 
between the two. 
Moreover, higher levels of defense spending may not necessarily equal expansion in 
military strength. Some spending literally goes down the drain. I am not referring to the silly 
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cases of the $600 toilet seats. They were exercises in cheap politics rather than examples of 
costly procurement. After all, how much less does a commercial airline pay for a similar piece 
of equipment? No, they do not use the toilet seats that you can buy at the local hardware store. 
Rather, I have in mind the many military projects that are terminated after many millions or 
even billions are spent on them without significant numbers of operational units to show for the 
effort. 
In any event, dollars matter because they are the most effective, albeit imperfect, way of 
representing national resources. Within an inevitably limited military budget, achieving a more 
effective utilization of resources is not a classroom exercise. It means striving to achieve a 
higher level of national security within a greatly contained budget. Quantitative economic and 
fiscal measures can help in that difficult undertaking. But economists will not win friends 
among the proponents of the programs that are rejected or curtailed during that process. 
It is fitting to give Adam Smith the last word. I have in mind the passage in the Wealth of 
Nations on the expense of defense, in which the patron saint of the economics profession de-
clares that such outlay "grows gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in 
civilization." 
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